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SHIPOWNER OR STEVEDORE: LIABILITY TO
INJURED LONGSHOREMEN
If a longshoreman is injured because of a defective piece of equipment,
normally he can recover from the shipowner on the theory that he has
breached the warranty of seaworthiness. Under what circumstances can the
shipowner in turn recover from the stevedoring company on the theory it
has breached the warranty of workmanlike service. A conflict has developed
as to how far a stevedoring firm's implied warranty of workmanlike service'
should be extended. In Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co.,2 the
Second Circuit ruled that this implied warranty places a duty on the steve-
dore to supply proper seaworthy equipment. It prohibits the use of equip-
ment which is latently defective even though the firm is not aware of the
defect and has not been negligent in its use. This imposes absolute liability
on the stevedore. When the Ninth Circuit was presented with this issue
in 1962 the Booth case was cited as persuasive authority for finding liability.
3
After a review of prior cases this court refused to extend the implied warranty
to include liability without fault. Its conclusion was that the major cases
in this area have limited recovery to situations involving negligent conduct
on the part of the stevedore.
In order to evaluate the reasoning of the two courts, it is necessary to
review the decisions regarding the theory of workmanlike service and the
earlier doctrine of unseaworthiness from which it arose. In 1903 the Supreme
Court in The Osceola4 ruled that the vessel and her owner are to be held
liable absolutely for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unsea-
worthiness of the ship or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper
appliances appurtenant to the ship. This duty to provide a seaworthy ship is
not dependent on the exercise of reasonable care but is absolute and non-
delegable. The shipowner, having complete and absolute control over the
seamen aboard his vessel, can control every movement the seamen make
and should therefore be held liable for any injuries to them which might
be caused by defects in the vessel herself or her equipment. Furthermore,
1. Exactly what this implied warranty of workmanlike service encompasses will
be hereinafter discussed.
2. 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
3. Italia Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 310 F.2d
481 (9th Cir. 1962).
4. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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the shipowner can afford to insure the safety of his crewmen and can treat
any damages paid for an injury as an expense of the business, thus spreading
the loss. 5 In this way seamen are assured of compensation merely by demon-
strating that an unseaworthy condition existed, and are not left to the un-
certain determinations of courts in actions to recover for negligence."
Exactly what does the condition of seaworthiness entail? The duty of
the shipowner is to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for
their intended use and no more. The test is not one of perfection but rather
one of reasonable fitness.7 What is more, seaworthiness does not apply to
any and every defect which causes injury. The doctrine is not that broad.
In order for a defective condition to constitute unseaworthiness on the part
of a ship, the defect must be found in the hull, gear, stowage, appurtenant
appliances or equipment of the ship.8
At first the theories of liability for unseaworthiness and liability because
of negligence were separate." If the injury was caused by negligence a charge
of unseaworthiness could not be raised. Then the Supreme Court in Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co.,10 ruled that if a shipowner is liable for furnishing an
unseaworthy appliance even when there is no negligence, a fortiori, the
shipowner is liable when the unseaworthy condition has resulted from the
negligence of the officers of the vessel. This reasoning seems sound when
we remember that one of the purposes of the unseaworthiness doctrine is
to make it easier for the injured seaman to recover compensation for his
injury by not forcing him to prove negligence.
The Court's next step in expanding this doctrine of unseaworthiness
was to extend the relief to longshoremen injured while working aboard the
ship." The Court reasoned that longshoremen on board ship are rendering
services like those performed by the crew. The risks involved in the steve-
doring duties are incident to the longshoreman's service to the ship. A long-
shoreman in these circumstances is nothing less than a seaman as to the duties
he performs and should be treated as such for the purposes of the liability
of the shipowner to him. It should not matter that an intermediate employer
stands between the longshoreman and the shipowner. 2
5. Shamrock Towing Co. v. Fichter Steel Corp., 155 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1946).
6. The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
7. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Recently the doctrine
has been extended to cover the cargo containers themselves as well as the stowage of the
cargo. Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 83 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1963).
9. Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
10. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). In this case a patently defective rope was selected and
supplied by the ship's mate; good rope was available.
11. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 8.
12. In discussing the liability of the intermediary employer who takes over portions
of the ship's work, the Court stated that he "ordinarily has neither rights nor opportunity
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Once it was held that longshoremen were entitled to a seaworthy vessel
and equipment, the operations of the longshoremen's employer became im-
portant. When a stevedoring firm enters into a contract to load or unload a
vessel, control of the area is usually relinquished by the shipowner. The
stevedore brings on board his own longshoremen, often his own equipment,
and is placed in complete charge of the unloading operation (subject to
cursory inspections by the ship's mate).
If the unseaworthiness of a ship is caused by the stevedore's defective
equipment, brought on board the vessel for a temporary purpose, should the
shipowner be held responsible? At first it was thought that if the shipowner
turned over a seaworthy ship to the stevedore his duty in this respect termi-
nated at the time control was relinquished.1
3 But the Supreme Court in a
per curiam decision, Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, answered the question of
liability in the affirmative. 14 This decision has been interpreted as standing
for the proposition that the shipowner's absolute liability to provide a sea-
worthy vessel, together with its appurtenant equipment, is not affected by
the relinquishment of control to the stevedore, and the shipowner is liable
even for defects in equipment brought on board by the stevedore and used
under the stevedore's sole control. 15 Nor is it a defense that the temporary
condition of unseaworthiness arose subsequent to the commencement of the
voyage.' 6 To protect the longshoreman courts had placed an enormous burden
upon the shipowner. Whether he could have prevented the injury was not
a consideration. If the vessel was in fact unseaworthy for any reason, he,
as the owner of that vessel, was liable for any injury caused thereby.
Courts realized that this treatment of the shipowner was harsh in situ-
ations where the stevedore created the unseaworthy condition. What could
to discover or remove the cause of the peril, and it is doubtful that he owes to his
employees, with respect to these hazards, an employer's ordinary duty to furnish a
safe place to work, unless the perils are obvious or his own action creates them." Id.
at 95. As will be seen, the stevedore-employer has been found to owe this duty to his
employees at least as far as the shipowner is concerned.
13. Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953). The
court distinguished Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952) on the
ground that in that case there was no evidence that the shipowner had surrendered
control of the ship.
14. 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirlinng 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953). The dissent argued
that although the doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is reasonable when
applied to a shipowner in relation to the ship itself and her equipment, there is no
justification for applying it to equipment owned by others and brought on board by them.
To so extend liability would make the shipowner responsible for results caused by
latent dangers he cannot guard against. The burden should be upon the one best able
to eliminate the hazard, the stevedoring company. (This is the argument raised by the
court in the Booth case to support the conclusion that the implied warranty of work-
manlike service extends to latent defects in equipment supplied by the stevedore.)
15. Berti v. Campagnie De Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954).
16. Supra note 7.
19631
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be done? Could they hold that if the stevedore was really the party at fault
he was the one who must ultimately pay? In considering this possibility,
the courts were faced with the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, enacted in 1927.17 Congress had intended this act to
have the same characteristics as the state and federal workmen's compensation
acts. The longshoreman injured in the course of his employment was to be
able to collect automatically a set compensation from his employer. The
employer gave up all defenses which he might raise against his employee's
recovery. Compensation was made payable irrespective of fault.18 In return,
the employer's liability was to be limited to the amounts set by the act. This
limitation of liability was supposedly assured by section 905 of the act:
The liability of an employer . . . shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal repre-
sentative . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury
or death . ... 19
This section seems to strictly limit any recovery from the employer to that
specified by the act itself.
The act also provides that the longshoreman has the right to elect to
sue a third party who is the sole or joint cause of his injury.20 He is given
the choice of accepting the compensation from his employer which the act
allows or trying to collect a greater sum from a third party.21 Under section
933 the longshoreman is not precluded from suing the shipowner for negli-
gence and unseaworthiness.
This leads back to our original question: What recourse does the ship-
owner have in this situation? He first tried to join the stevedore as an
additional defendant, alleging that since the stevedore-employer's negligence
had contributed to the injuries he should also contribute to the damages.
The Supreme Court put an end to this argument, ruling that there is no
contribution among joint tort-feasors in this area, no matter what the degree
of fault involved.
22
17. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1958).
18. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 34(b), 44 Stat.
1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1958).
19. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 5, 44 Stat. 1426
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
20. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 33, 44 Stat. 1426
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1958). See American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S.
446 (1947).
21. The longshoreman can put more than one iron in the fire, however. He may
receive compensation from his employer under the act and at the same time sue a
third party for damages. If he receives a verdict against the third party, he must then
reimburse his employer for any payments made.
22. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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The next argument raised by the shipowner was that he should be
indemnified by the stevedore if his (the shipowner's) negligence was only
passive or secondary and the stevedore's negligence actively brought into
play the unseaworthiness 23 or prior negligence. 24 The claim here is not for
contribution but for full indemnity. The shipowner is alleging not that the
stevedore is jointly liable but rather that he is solely at fault-that the ship-
owner is being held liable for the stevedore's acts. The stevedore should
reimburse him, argues the shipowner.25 The circuits have generally held
that this argument is invalid since it brings tort liability upon the stevedore;
the Longshoreman's Act specifically says he should not be answerable in
tort except under the terms of the act itself. To rule otherwise would violate
the "spirit of the entire statute whereunder an employer's duty to pay com-
pensation to his injured employees without regard to negligence is substituted
for his common law tort liability.
'26
Tort liability could not be imposed upon the stevedore. But this did
not mean that the right to indemnity could not arise by virtue of an express
contract between the shipowner and the stevedore. The act does not expressly
prohibit the shipowner from insuring himself by including a promise to hold
him harmless in the contract with the stevedore. Such a contract would be
independent of and would not derive from the injury to the longshoreman,
except in a remote sense not contemplated by the provisions of section 905 of
the act.
2 7
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co. 28 held that merely placing
into a contract the clause that the stevedore will perform all of the ship-
owner's stevedoring services implied that these services would be performed
in a safe and workmanlike manner. This obligation is implied in fact and
not in law, arising out of and being the essence of the contractual obligation
to perform the stevedoring services. Although the Ryan case dealt only with
improper stowage by the stevedore, the decision demonstrated that the Court
was willing to recognize an implied-in-fact warranty upon which to base a
suit for indemnity. The next step was to extend this warranty to cover the
use of equipment incidental to the handling of the cargo (whether such equip-
In the district court, evidence was brought in bearing on the relative degree of fault, and
it was found that the shipowner was 25% and the stevedore 75% at fault.
23. Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949).
24. United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
1950) ; McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107
N.E.2d 463 (1952).
25. States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253 (9th
Cir. 1953).
26. Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1954).
27. Crawford v. Pope & Talbot Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 792 (3d Cir. 1953).
28. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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ment was supplied by shipowner or stevedore). This was accomplished in
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Inc. 29 Again there was
no express indemnity clause present in the contract between the parties,
but the Court found an implied warranty to "use the equipment with reason-
able safety and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting to the shipowner
from the contractor's improper performance." If the stevedore renders a sub-
standard performance which leads to foreseeable liability for the shipowner,
the stevedore has breached his implied warranty, and the shipowner is
entitled to indemnity "absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude re-
covery."
3 0
The area of indemnification though broadening was still limited to
situations in which there was a contract between the two parties which this
implied warranty of workmanlike service could accompany. This limitation
did not remain in existence very long. One year after the Weyerhaeuser
decision, the Court handed down its decision in Crumady v. The Joachim
Hendrik Fisser.3 1 In this case the vessel had been chartered by its owners
to another company, which in turn had entered into a service agreement with
the stevedoring company. The Court found the case to be governed by its
Ryan decision. The reasoning was elementary: "The warranty which a steve-
dore owes when he goes aboard a vessel to perform services is plainly for
the benefit of the vessel whether the vessel's owners are parties to the contract
or not."'3 2 Under these circumstances the vessel is a third-party beneficiary
of the servicing contract. The action was a proceeding in rem, and the vessel
was mentioned in the contract. These characteristics justify application of
the third-party beneficiary theory. Its application was not limited to such
cases, however. In a later case the Court ruled that the owner, no less than
the ship, is the beneficiary of the stevedore's warranty.
3
Courts have given the warranty remedy broad scope, but the shipowner
must meet certain conditions to be entitled to the remedy. Originally, the
only culpable conduct on the shipowner's part that would not bar recovery
was merely failing to discover the stevedore's negligence.3 4 But it is now
generally agreed that even a finding of negligence in supplying defective
equipment will not necessarily bar the shipowner's right to indemnity. Since
the shipowner's action is in contract, recovery must depend upon whether
29. 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
30. Id. at 567.
31. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
32. Id. at 428.
33. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); De
Gioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962) (literal or figurative
third-party beneficiary language unnecessary).
34. Trygstad v. States Marine Corp., 150 F. Supp. 556 (D. Ore. 1957).
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his conduct has been such as to bar enforcement of the contract, and not
on whether he has been found negligent in regard to the longshoreman.8 5
Where the terms of a contract do not expressly impose upon one an obligation
sought to be imposed, the obligation "must . . . be implied in fact from
inferences necessarily arising out of circumstances surrounding the contract
and its performance. '36 A ship coming into port after days at sea cannot
be expected to be in a fully seaworthy condition. The stevedoring company
should realize this and act accordingly. The only contractual duties the
shipowner owes to the stevedoring company (absent express provision) are:
(1) "to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to place the
ship . . . . [its] equipment and appliances . . . in such condition that
an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he
should reasonably expect to encounter . . ." will be able to do his work "in a
workmanlike manner and with reasonable safety" to his longshoremen ;87 and
(2) to give the stevedore
reasonable warning of the existence of any latent or hidden danger
which has not been remedied and is not usually encountered or
reasonably to be expected by any expert and experienced steve-
doring company in the performance of the stevedoring work aboard
the ship, if the shipowner actually knows or, in the exercise of ordi-
nary care under the circumstances, should know of the existence of
such danger .... 38
What conduct on the part of the stevedore will be considered a sub-
standard performance of its duties, entitling the shipowner to indemnity?
What will constitute a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike
service? The basic premise is that if the stevedore fails to use reasonable
care in handing either equipment or cargo-gives a substandard performance
of his duties resulting in foreseeable loss to the shipowner by rendering
him vulnerable to a lawsuit-the stevedore has breached his obligation to the
shipowner under the contract. 39 Although the Supreme Court has not laid
down a comprehensive rule for determining what constitutes substandard
performance, there are two broad areas into which the performance might
fall: (1) conduct which creates the unseaworthy condition of the vessel;
and (2) conduct which activates the ship's pre-existing unseaworthy con-
dition.
It seems reasonable that if the stevedore negligently uses the ship-
35. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1959).
36. Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601, 609 (S.D. Cal.
1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1960).
37. 170 F. Supp. at 610-11.
38. Ibid.
39. Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962).
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owner's seaworthy equipment and creates an unseaworthy condition,40 or
negligently supplies its own defective equipment, its performance should
be considered a substandard one.41 But what should be considered activating
a ship's pre-existing unseaworthy condition, the second area mentioned? It
should be remembered that, on the one hand, the stevedore does not act as
an insurer against any loss. 42 A court would not imply a promise on the
part of the stevedore to protect the shipowner from injury that was his fault
only.43 On the other hand, that the shipowner failed to fulfill his duty to
supply adequate equipment is not enough by itself to prevent indemnity. 41
But if the stevedore knows of the unseaworthy condition and fails to
correct it or fails to stop his longshoremen from continuing to work under
hazardous conditions, he is negligent and has breached the warranty.45 The
continuance of work, with knowledge of the danger washes away prior negli..
gence on the part of the shipowner and leaves the stevedore's conduct as
the cause of the injury.46  The shipowner owes no duty to restrain the
stevedore from acting or using the ship's defective gear with disregard for
known defects.4 7 In fact, the stevedore's actual knowledge of the unsafe con--
dition may not be necessary. If an employee of the stevedore is put on notice
that a part of the ship may not be safe he must not use his judgment
in assuming that a safe condition exists. 48 It would seem that the stevedore
will ultimately bear the loss unless the injury is caused solely by the ship--
40. There is still some debate over whether there should be a distinction between
injuries caused by unseaworthy gear and injuries caused by improper use of proper
gear. See the dissent's arguments in Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 924 (2d
Cir. 1956).
41. We speak only of negligently supplying defective equipment. Whether a
similar rule should apply to the non-negligent supplying of defective equipment will
be discussed hereinafter.
42. Ferrigno v. Ocean Transp. Ltd., 201 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
43. Shannon v. United States, 235 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1956). "[T]o imply a
duty on the part of the stevedore toward the shipowner to inspect the equipment before
using it for the very purpose for which it was supplied or to detect patent defects would
be to imply a promise on the part of the stevedore to protect the shipowner from its
own negligence." The court then goes on to find an express agreement to inspect.
44. Pettus v. Grace Lines Inc., 305 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1962).
45. American President Lines, Ltd. v. Marine Terminal Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1956). But see Hagans v. Farrell Lines Inc., 237 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1956), where
the court argued that knowledge of and acquiescence in the existence of defective appli.-
ances do not place a burden on the stevedore to correct them as long as the defective
equipment is supplied by the shipowner.
46. A/SJ Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d
227 (2d Cir. 1958).
47. Weigel v. M.S. Belgrano, 188 F. Supp. 605 (D. Ore. 1960), reversed in 299
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1962) on the ground that the injured party was not doing the type
of work traditionally performed by seamen.
48. Smith v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidea, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960). The
court ruled that the safety man's judgment was not vindicated by the fact that three
men used the ladder without incident before the accident.
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owner's negligence or by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel to which the
stevedore cannot be connected in any way.
49
At this point, it appears that the law may be a little harsh in its treat-
ment of stevedores. However, there may be a trend at least in the lower
courts and possibly even in the Supreme Court to mollify the situation. Possi-
bly courts are beginning to realize they may have extended their breach-of-
warranty findings a bit too far. After all, if the shipowner has also been
negligent why should the entire liability be placed upon the stevedore?
Formerly it was held that an express warranty in a contract would not
bar the finding of an implied obligation to indemnify the shipowner.50 In a
recent Second Circuit decision 5' the court held that an action on the implied
warranty cannot be brought where there is an express warranty in existence.
Although the court held the stevedore liable under the express warranty in
this case, a different result is possible. Suppose the express warranty states
that the stevedore will protect the shipowner from any liability which might
arise solely from the stevedore's negligence. Suppose further that a court
finds both the stevedore and shipowner negligent. The court might then
conclude that the express warranty bars the raising of the implied warranty
of workmanlike service; the shipowner cannot recover from the stevedore
since the sole negligence of the stevedore was not the cause of the resulting
damages. Such a result is a possibility.
In 1959 it was held that the fact that unloading is done in the customary
manner does not necessarily mean that the stevedore has satisfied the
standard of reasonable care.52 The court reasoned that the fact that the ship-
owner does not insist that the stevedore perform his services in a safer way
than is usual does not mean that the shipowner accepts the responsibility for
a practice which is unsafe. The Fifth Circuit recently held that although
compliance with the customs of an industry is not in itself due care, it is
evidence of due care. The shipowner must affirmatively show the unreason-
ableness of customary practice.58 The burden of proving or disproving the
reasonableness of performance has shifted from the stevedore to the ship-
owner.
A 1962 Supreme Court ruling may reflect this trend. The Court in
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines54 reversed a lower court's
decree of indemnity on the ground that although there was a breach of the
49. 61 MICH. L. REV. 539 (1963).
50. Oleszcuk v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 169 F. Supp. 628 (D. Md. 1958), rev'd, 266
F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1959).
51. D'Agosta v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1962).
52. Curtis v. A Garcia Y Cia, 272 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1959).
53. Cia Maritima Del Nervion v. Flanagan Shipping Corp., 308 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1962).
54. 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
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implied warranty of workmanlike service present, that breach did not cause
the injury to the longshoreman. There can be no indemnity without a clear
causal connection.
A new view has been taken as to what will constitute a breach of war-
ranty in the situation where the stevedore carries on the work with the ship-
owner's latently defective equipment. This view takes the position that the
stevedore need do no more than make a cursory inspection of any equipment
supplied by the shipowner (or of the area in which his longshoremen are to
work.) A ship in port must get underway as quickly as possible and without
the expense, delay, and interference with the ship's equipment which a
complete inspection would entail.5 5 Since the shipowner would not expect
the inspection, it would not be the mutual contractual understanding of the
parties, and no implied-in-fact warranty to that effect can arise.
If the stevedore does receive notice of a defect in the equipment supplied,
passes this knowledge on to the shipowner, and gives him an opportunity
to remedy the situation, the stevedore will not be deemed to have breached
his implied warranty by not stopping the work and rejecting the equipment-
at least when the shipowner asks him to continue the work.56 Although both
are negligent (the stevedore by continuing to work with defective equipment
and the shipowner in failing to repair the equipment), the stevedore's action
should not be considered a breach. His job is to get the work done efficiently
and quickly. To stop the work might open him up to a charge of breaching
the express terms of his contract.
57
With this background in the law surrounding the stevedore's implied
warranty, one is prepared to analyze the two decisions which inspired this
Comment. Should the indemnity doctrine be extended to cover injuries re-
sulting from latently defective equipment supplied by the stevedore without
knowledge of the defect? The court in the Booth case felt that the implied war-
ranty should cover the situation. True, the Ryan and Weyerhaeuser cases
were concerned with situations in which the non-discovery of the cause of
the injury constituted a negligent omission. But that fact would not exclude
the existence of liability without fault. As a matter of fact, the Ryan case,
in comparing the implied warranty to a manufacturer's warranty of the
soundness of its manufactured product,"8 impliedly sanctioned this extension.
Williston, dealing with this topic," states that the effect of that warranty
is to make the manufacturer absolutely responsible for the existence of the
warranted qualities. It makes no difference whether the manufacturer-seller
55. See Curtis v. A. Garcia Y Cia, supra note 52.
56. Cruz v. Hudson S.S. Co., 206 F. Supp. 216 (D.P.R. 1962).
57. United States v. Harrison, 245 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1957).
58. Supra note 28, at 133-34.
59. 1 WILLISTON, SALES 237 (1948).
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is guilty of any fault in the matter; if he fails to supply a product of the
quality warranted, he has breached his contract, whether the defect is latent
or visible and however honest his intention may have been. The court in the
Booth case felt that this reasoning was especially valid where the supplier
of the equipment is also the user of it in performing his services. The ship-
owner recognizes the expertise of the stevedore in both selection and use of
the equipment. The shipowner relies on the ability and experience of the
other and at most will make only a routine inspection of the equipment em-
ployed. The ultimate burden should be on the one in the best position to
find the defect and correct it-the stevedore. The court might have mentioned
that stevedoring firms are large and able to spread the burden of compen-
sating injured longshoremen throughout the shipping industry as well as the
shipowner can. Since no one is really very blameworthy in this situation
and, at the same time, the longshoreman should be able to collect for his in-
jury, should not such funds flow from his employer? But what becomes of
the exclusiveness of the employer's liability under section 905 ? The protection
of that statute vanishes.
The Ninth Circuit decision viewed this area of the law in an entirely
different light. The court tried to look to the reasons behind prior decisions
in interpreting their wording. Consider the type of warranty implied. It is a
warranty of workmanlike service. The word "workmanlike" describes an
ordinary standard of performance. The closest synonym to "workmanlike"
is "skillful"; a job well done is connoted by such terms. These terms set a
standard. Failure to meet the standard would constitute negligence. Liability
without fault simply does not fit into the framework of this language. The
language in the cases speaks in terms of reasonable care and lack of negli-
gence. Consider the background behind prior decisions: unwillingness to
back down from the decision in the Halcyon case, where the Court ruled
that there can be no contribution between joint tort-feasors; the express pro-
visions of the Longshoremen's Compensation Act-in the face of these
obstacles the feeling that the owner should not be compelled to pay for the
stevedore's faults. It seems reasonable that courts intended only to impose
a liability in contract similar to that which would be imposed in tort were
it not for the prior Halcyon decision. Although the remedy is in contract
rather than tort, the standard of performance should be the same with negligent
conduct constituting a breach. What of the Ryan case's comparison of
this implied warranty to the manufacturer's warranty? The Ninth Circuit
decision considered this analogy invalid and distinguished the warranties: the
stevedore's warranty involves the performance of services, not a physical
product. There is no valid reason to extend this warranty to cover liability
without fault, stated the court.
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Which of these two decisions is sounder and which one will be sustained
if the Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide is a difficult question.
Each decision has its good points and both can be found lacking to a certain
extent. The best view should place the burden of protecting or indem-
nifying the longshoreman on the person best able to provide for the
longshoreman's safety. The party held liable should be the one who created
the unseaworthy condition in the first instance unless there is a show-
ing that the other party should have prevented this condition from taking
effect. Under this theory the party who supplies the defective equipment, if
nothing more is involved, should be the one to pay.
GERALD J. BATT
